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Abstract
This essay examines how European competition law can move toward an improved analytical
framework for resale price maintenance (”RPM”) cases consistent with the view of European
competition law as a consumer welfare prescription. Before addressing RPM issues directly, Part
I summarizes a few ground rules on the analytical framework in article 101 TFEU (”Treaty on
the Functioning of the European Union”) cases in an economics-based competition regime. This
Part should help avoid the circularity of the argument that a restraint such as RPM should be
considered a “restriction by object” under article 101(1) TFEU because it is characterized as a
“hardcore” violation in a Commission block exemption regulation, and conversely, it is classified
as a “hardcore” violation because it is a “restriction by object.” This part should also help allay
concerns that moving RPM out of the “hardcore” comfort zone would automatically convert RPM
analysis into a morass of endless inquiries and steep evidentiary requirements where, in the end,
a plaintiff or competition authority would almost invariably lose, even in cases where RPM is
harmful.
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INTRODUCTION 
Only a few years ago, most observers would have predicted 
that the review of the vertical restraints block exemption1 and 
accompanying guidelines2 in Europe would be relatively 
uneventful. One could have expected that after the reforms in 
1999,3 no major changes to the vertical restraints regime would 
be considered. In fact, most would have suspected that the set of 
firmly entrenched, form-based rules that declared certain 
distribution restraints, including resale price maintenance 
(“RPM”), to be a hardcore competition law violation would be 
grandfathered in without any thoughtful and robust debate 
about desirable adjustments, even as the European competition 
 
*  The author would like to thank Svend Albaek, John Fingleton, William Kovacic, 
and Jeremy West for helpful comments, and Maria Luisa di Lauro for research 
assistance. This Essay was originally presented at the 2009 Fordham Corporate Law 
Institute’s Annual Conference on International Antitrust Law and Policy and the Essay is 
also published as Andreas P. Reindl, Resale Price Maintenance and Article 81 EC: Developing 
a More Sensible Analytical Approach, in INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST LAW & POLICY: 
FORDHAM COMPETITION LAW 2009, ch. 22 (Barry Hawk ed., 2010). 
1. Commission Regulation on the Application of Article 81(3) of the Treaty to 
Categories of Vertical Agreements and Concerted Practices, No. 2790/1999, 1999 O.J. 
L 336/21 [hereinafter 1999 Block Exemption on Vertical Agreements]; Commission 
Notice, 2000 O.J. C 291/1 [hereinafter 2000 Guidelines on Vertical Restraints]. 
2. Commission Notice, 2000 O.J. C 291/1 [hereinafter Guidelines on Vertical 
Restraints]. 
3. The block exemption on vertical agreements and its corresponding guidelines 
were regarded as a successful first step toward an economics-based evaluation of vertical 
restraints focused primarily on market power concerns, and away from the traditional, 
form-based and block exemption dependent approach that sought to micromanage how 
firms would use vertical restraints. See, e.g., Derek Ridyard & Simon Bishop, E.C. Vertical 
Restraints Guidelines: Effects Based or Per Se Policy?, 23 EUR. COMPETITION L. REV. 35, 35–37 
(2002) (observing that the European Commission (“Commission”) had started to move 
towards a more coherent policy on vertical restraints, but identifying areas in which 
further reforms would be necessary). 
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regime was otherwise determined to move toward a more 
economics-oriented approach. 
The climate was substantially changed when a small 
producer of ladies’ shoes, handbags, and other leather 
accessories decided to implement an RPM scheme for one of its 
product lines despite a clear rule declaring such a strategy per se 
unlawful under the U.S. antitrust laws. The controversial U.S. 
Supreme Court decision in Leegin, which overturned nearly 100 
year-old precedent that had declared RPM to be per se illegal,4 
was accompanied by a vigorous debate in the United States about 
the appropriate legal rules and analytical approaches concerning 
RPM. Following the Leegin decision, several courts already have 
grappled with the question of how to properly analyze RPM 
schemes that no longer conveniently fit into the per se unlawful 
pigeonhole.5 
It was inevitable that these developments, which coincided 
with the review of the existing European vertical restraints 
regime, would trigger a policy discussion in Europe on how the 
existing vertical restraints regime could be improved so that 
competition law enforcement in RPM cases would better reflect 
the consumer welfare goals of European competition law.6 The 
broader debate encompasses a number of questions at the 
interface between legal rules and economic principles, including: 
which economic principles and empirical evidence best describe 
the beneficial and harmful effects of RPM; how analysis under 
article 101 TFEU (“Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union”) (article 81 EC (“Treaty Establishing the European 
 
4. Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 907 (2007) The 
case overruled a long-standing U.S. Supreme Court decision from the turn of the 
century that held resale price maintenance (“RPM”) to be a per se violation of section 1 
of the Sherman Act. See Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons, 220 U.S. 373 
(1911). 
5. See, e.g., Toledo Mack Sales & Serv., Inc. v. Mack Trucks, Inc., 530 F.3d 204, 229–
30 (3d Cir. 2008) (reversing a dismissal of an RPM complaint); PSKS, Inc. v. Leegin 
Creative Leather Prods., Inc., 2009-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) ¶ 76,592, 2009 WL 938561, at *8 
(E.D. Tex. Apr. 6, 2009) (dismissing the action on remand from the U.S. Supreme Court 
for failing to identify a relevant market); Babyage.com, Inc. v. Toys “R” Us, Inc., 558 F. 
Supp. 2d 575, 589 (E.D. Pa. 2008) (denying a motion to dismiss a complaint that 
included an alleged RPM scheme initiated by retailer). 
6. See John Vickers, Competition Law and Economics: a Mid-Atlantic Viewpoint, 3 EUR. 
COMPETITION J. 1, 12 (2007) (remarking that the reversal of Dr. Miles should trigger a 
more serious debate of RPM also in Europe). 
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Community”))7 can consistently incorporate economic concepts; 
and how evidentiary requirements should be allocated between 
article 101(1) TFEU and article 101(3) TFEU and therefore 
between plaintiff (which may be a competition authority) and 
defendant. 
This Essay examines how European competition law can 
move toward an improved analytical framework for RPM cases8 
consistent with the view of European competition law as a 
consumer welfare prescription.9 Before addressing RPM issues 
directly, Part I summarizes a few ground rules on the analytical 
framework in article 101 TFEU cases in an economics-based 
competition regime. This Part should help avoid the circularity 
of the argument that a restraint such as RPM should be 
considered a “restriction by object” under article 101(1) TFEU 
because it is characterized as a “hardcore” violation in a 
Commission block exemption regulation, and, conversely, it is 
classified as a “hardcore” violation because it is a “restriction by 
 
7. See Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union art. 101, 2008 O.J. C 115/47, at 88–89 [hereinafter TFEU]; Consolidated Version 
of the Treaty Establishing the European Community art. 81, 2006 O.J. C 321 E/37, at 73 
[hereinafter EC Treaty]. When the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
(“TFEU”) entered into force on December 1, 2009, treaty provisions of the major 
European Union (“EU”) treaties were renumbered and article 81 of the Treaty 
Establishing the European Community (“EC”) became article 101 TFEU. This Essay will 
use the new numbering system to refer to the related provisions of EU competition law; 
references to article 81 will be maintained for legal instruments and other documents 
that predate the TFEU. 
8. The initial version of the Essay was written while the review of the European 
vertical restraints regime was pending. Although the Commission ultimately decided to 
maintain the strict rules on RPM, the arguments developed in this Essay calling for a 
reform of the rules governing RPM remain valid. 
9. It is widely recognized that consumer welfare is the principal goal of European 
competition law and the Essay assumes that this is the correct view. See, e.g., Philip Lowe, 
Director General, Eur. Comm’n Directorate General for Competition, Speech at the 
13th International Conference on Competition and 14th European Competition Day: 
Consumer Welfare and Efficiency—New Guidelines and Principles of Competition 
Policy (Mar. 27, 2007), available at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/speeches/text/
sp2007_02_en.pdf (emphasizing that the ultimate aim of European competition law 
enforcement is the protection of consumer welfare); see also Neelie Kroes, Eur. Comm’r 
for Competition Policy, Opening Address at Competition and Consumers in the 21st 
Century Conference: Consumer Welfare: More than a Slogan (Oct. 21, 2009), available 
at http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=SPEECH/09/486&
format=pdf (suggesting that consumer welfare concerns are reflected in every aspect of 
the European Commission’s competition system). It should be recognized, however, 
that this view is not uniformly shared; for some, notions of “individual freedom,” 
“fairness,” and “structure of competition” remain important goals as well.  
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object.” This Part should also help allay concerns that moving 
RPM out of the “hardcore” comfort zone would automatically 
convert RPM analysis into a morass of endless inquiries and steep 
evidentiary requirements where, in the end, a plaintiff or 
competition authority would almost invariably lose, even in cases 
where RPM is harmful. 
There is little doubt that the rules the European 
Commission (“Commission”) has decided to maintain for RPM10 
are not aligned with the economic goals of European 
competition law. This in itself should be an uncontroversial 
conclusion that does not require further discussion. The main 
point of this Essay, however, is that the current rules on RPM are 
misguided because they are designed to make nearly impossible a 
meaningful, fact-based analysis in future cases that could reflect 
the serious debate concerning RPM and incorporate newer 
economic research. The rules unreasonably limit the ability of 
competition authorities and courts to gather the necessary 
experience and empirical evidence in RPM cases that is necessary 
to develop improved methods to analyze RPM cases and 
accurately distinguish between harmful and benign or beneficial 
cases of RPM.11 The European competition regime is capable of 
utilizing a more nuanced analytical approach in RPM cases, 
consistent with the approach in other competition cases that 
raise almost identical competitive concerns, without losing the 
ability to prosecute harmful instances of RPM. 
 
10. See Commission Regulation on the Application of Article 101(3) of the Treaty 
on the Functioning of the European Union to Categories of Vertical Agreements and 
Concerted Practices, No. 330/2010, art. 4(a), 2010 O.J. L 102/1, at 5 [hereinafter Block 
Exemption on Vertical Agreements] (characterizing RPM as a “hardcore” competition 
law violation); Commission Notice, 2010 O.J. C 130/1, at 12 [hereinafter Guidelines on 
Vertical Restraints] (discussing the Commission’s reasons for “hardcore” 
characterization of RPM). 
11. See Ridyard & Bishop, supra note 3, at 37 (observing the importance of case law 
for the development of sound competition law norms); see also Daniel P. O’Brien, The 
Antitrust Treatment of Vertical Restraints: Beyond the Possibility Theorem, in Konkurrensverket, 
in PROS AND CONS OF VERTICAL RESTRAINTS 40, 43–44 (Arvid Fredenberg & Sten Nyberg 
eds., 2008) (describing how competition authority should seek to establish a prior belief 
about effects of business practices in light of empirical literature and update the belief 
in light of case based evidence). 
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I. ECONOMICS-BASED FRAMEWORK FOR ARTICLE 101 
ANALYSIS 
For many years there has been considerable debate over the 
correct analytical framework for restrictive agreements under 
article 101 TFEU (article 81 EC). Unfortunately, this is an area in 
which the European courts have not provided much leadership. 
Although some cases put market power concerns in the center of 
article 101(1) TFEU analysis,12 overall the courts and advocates 
general have expressed many different, and sometimes 
inconsistent, views about the analytical framework contained in 
article 101. In particular, recent European case law on article 101 
TFEU has become something like a Rorschach test where 
everyone can find some support for whatever view of article 101 
TFEU one holds.13 
The Commission’s guidance has been uneven as well. The 
guidelines on the application of article 81(3) (article 101(3) 
TFEU), for example, envisage an analysis that reflects consumer 
welfare economics, connecting the concept of a “restriction of 
competition” with (likely) price and output effects of a particular 
 
12. See, e.g., GlaxoSmithKline Servs. Unltd. v. Commission (GlaxoSmithKline I), 
Case T-168/01, [2006] E.C.R. II-2969, ¶¶ 109–12; see also O2 (Germany) GmbH v. 
Commission, Case T-328/03, [2006] E.C.R. II-1231, ¶¶ 66–69, 71–72, 116 (applying an 
article 101(1) TFEU (article 81(1) EC) analysis grounded in concepts of market power 
and consumer welfare). The European Court of Justice (“ECJ”) reversed the Court of 
First Instance (“CFI”) in GlaxoSmithKline on the issue of article 101(1) TFEU (article 
81(1) EC) analysis and held that restraints on parallel trade in pharmaceutical products 
must be considered “restriction of competition by object” without further factual 
analysis. GlaxoSmithKline Servs. Unltd. v. Commission (GlaxoSmithKline II), Joined 
Cases 501, 513, 515, 519/06, [2010] E.C.R. __, [2010] 4 C.M.L.R. 50, 131–32. 
13. Compare GlaxoSmithKline II, [2010] 4 C.M.L.R. 50, 132 (suggesting that article 
101(1) TFEU (article 81(1) EC) analysis is also concerned with “structure of the 
market” and harm to competition “as such”), and T-Mobile Netherlands BV v. Raad van 
Bestuur van de Nederlandse Mededingingsautoriteit, Case C-8/08, [2009] E.C.R. 4529, ¶ 
27 (stressing that “close regard must be paid . . . to [the] economic and legal context” 
when analyzing a restriction of competition under article 101(1) TFEU (article 81(1) 
EC) (citing Competition Authority v. Beef Indus. Dev. Soc’y, Ltd., Case C-209/07, 
[2008] E.C.R. I-8637, ¶¶ 16, 21; NV IAZ Int’l Belg. v. Commission, Joined Cases 96–102, 
104–05, 108, 110/82, [1983] E.C.R. 3369, ¶ 25)), and GlaxoSmithKline I, [2006] E.C.R. II-
2969, ¶¶ 109–10 (same), and O2 (Germany), [2006] E.C.R. II-1231, ¶ 66 (same (citing 
Béguelin Import Co. v. S.A.G.L. Import Export, Case 22/71, [1971] E.C.R. 949)), with 
Métropole télévision (M6) v. Commission, Case T-112/99, [2001] E.C.R. II-2459, ¶ 107–
12 (emphasizing that “restriction [of competition]” in article 101(1) TFEU (article 
81(1) EC) is an “objective” concept not directly linked to an analysis of the facts of a 
case). 
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restraint.14 Along the same lines, the new vertical agreements 
block exemption and accompanying guidelines continue to 
recognize market power as a key condition to determine whether 
vertical restraints are capable of harming consumer welfare.15 
The same documents, however, continue to condemn a range of 
vertical restraints as “hardcore” violations based on a pure form-
based approach and without explaining how these restraints 
invariably enable firms to increase their market power.16 
This Part seeks to identify a few broad principles that should 
inform article 101 TFEU analysis in a competition regime that is 
focused on consumer welfare. It relies on the substantial recent 
scholarship and debate on the topic of proper article 101 TFEU 
analysis,17 although it will focus more than other contributions 
on the “restriction by object” analytical route, a seriously 
underdeveloped and largely untested concept in European 
 
14. Commission Notice, 2004 O.J. C 101/97, at 98 [hereinafter Guidelines on 
Application of Article 81(3)] (explaining that the prohibition in article 81(1) EC 
(article 101(1) TFEU) focuses on whether an agreement likely has an appreciable 
adverse impact on price, output, product quality, product variety, and innovation). 
Consistent with these concepts, the guidelines also make the distinction between an 
“object”-based analysis and an “effect”-based analysis in light of whether certain 
restraints will almost invariably have the effect of reducing consumer welfare or require 
a case by case analysis to determine their effects. Id., 2004 O.J. C 101/97, at 100–01. 
15. See Block Exemption on Vertical Agreements, pmbl. ¶¶ 7–9, art. 8, 2010 O.J. L 
102/1, at 2, 6; Guidelines on Vertical Restraints, 2010 O.J. C 130/1, at 4, 21. 
16. The Commission’s alternative method for identifying a “restriction of 
competition,” which depends on whether the Commission thinks that an intrabrand 
restraint was “objectively necessary,” is also inconsistent with economic principles. See, 
e.g., Guidelines on Application of Article 81(3), 2004 O.J. C 101/97, at 99 (extending 
the notion of “restriction of competition” to intrabrand restraints that the Commission 
does not deem “objectively necessary”). 
17. See Renato Nazzini, Article 81 EC Between Time Present and Time Past: a Normative 
Critique of “Restriction of Competition” in EU Law, 43 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 497, 504 
(2006) (arguing that article 101(1) TFEU (article 81(1) EC) analysis must focus on 
harmful effects on allocative efficiency); see also Alison Jones, Analysis of Agreements under 
U.S. and EC antitrust law—Covergence or Divergence, 51 ANTITRUST BULL. 691, 770 (2006) 
(concluding that European case law supports the view that a “restriction of competition” 
requires actual or likely output and price effects); Beverley Robertson, What Is a 
Restriction of Competition? The Implications of the CFI’s Judgment in O2 Germany and the Rule 
of Reason, 28 EUR. COMPETITION L. REV. 252, 262 (2007) (suggesting that economic 
analysis of the effects of an agreement should occur under article 101(1) TFEU (article 
81(1) EC)). This debate is not new; other authors have suggested an article 101 TFEU 
analysis consistent with economic principles for some time. See, e.g., Ian S. Forrester & 
Christopher Norall, The Laicization of Community Law: Self-help and the Rule of Reason: How 
Competition Law Is and Could Be Applied, 21 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 11, 38–40 (1984); 
Barry E. Hawk, System Failure: Vertical Restraints and EC Competition Policy, 32 COMMON 
MKT. L. REV. 973, 975 (1995). 
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competition law, and on principles common to a “restriction by 
object” analysis and a “restriction by effect” analysis under article 
101(1) TFEU. This appears particularly relevant for a discussion 
of vertical restraints analysis in light of the characterization of 
RPM and certain other intrabrand restraints as “hardcore” 
restraints, the regulatory equivalent to “restriction by object,” in 
the vertical agreements block exemption and corresponding 
guidelines.18 
A. Concept of “Restriction of Competition” and Market Power Analysis 
Adhering to a consumer welfare standard means putting the 
concept of market power in the center of article 101(1) analysis.19 
An allegation that an agreement “restricts competition” must be 
accompanied by a theory of harm that explains how the 
agreement facilitates the exercise of market power and leads to a 
market-wide increase in price or reduction in output,20 compared 
with a no agreement counterfactual.21 Without a story connecting 
market power and competitive harm there can be no violation of 
article 101(1) TFEU (article 81(1) EC) and no burden can be 
imposed on the defendant to provide substantiated justifications. 
This is consistent with several judgments22 and the Commission’s 
guidelines on the application of article 81(3).23 
 
18. See supra note 10 (classifying RPM as a “hardcore” violation of competition law 
and outlining the underlying rationale for this classification). 
19. See case law and literature cited supra notes 12, 17. 
20. There can be alternative “harm scenarios,” like reduced choice or reduced 
innovation as a result of a restrictive agreement that increases market power, but, for 
purposes of this paper, price and output effects are used as proxies for consumer harm. 
Some have suggested that the inquiry under article 101(1) TFEU (article 81(1) EC) 
should focus on directly determining whether the agreement increases market power, 
rather than on price and output effects. See Vittorio Cerulli Irelli, Article 81(1) EC: Some 
Remarks on the Notion of Restriction of Competition, 20 EUR. BUS. L. REV. 287, 293 (2009). 
But it is unclear how market power could be measured directly. 
21. This inquiry may in certain circumstances require at least a preliminary analysis 
into whether the agreement enables competition that would otherwise not exist. See, e.g., 
O2 (Germany), [2006] E.C.R. II-1231, ¶¶ 114–15 (holding that the Commission should 
have considered the possibility that an agreement among competitors could have 
enabled a smaller rival to enter and compete as provider of mobile phone services); 
Nazzini, supra note 17, at 516–17 (suggesting that some balancing of positive and 
negative effects may be required under article 101(1) while acknowledging the 
difficulties of such a balancing exercise). 
22. See, e.g., Eur. Night Servs., Ltd. (EPS) v. Commission, Joined Cases T-374–75, 
384, 388/94, [1998] E.C.R. II-3141, ¶¶ 136–37 (remarking that there can be no finding 
of a restriction of competition without delineation of the relevant market and a story 
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Article 101 TFEU has only one concept of “restriction of 
competition,” regardless of whether the analysis is built around a 
“restriction by object” theory or its regulatory equivalent, the 
categorization as a “hardcore” restraint, or a “restriction by 
effect” theory.24 A “restriction by object” analysis or “hardcore” 
categorization must reflect the same economic concepts as a 
fuller analysis of the facts of a specific case. 
Firms can anticompetitively increase market power either 
directly, through an arrangement that facilitates coordination 
and reduces competition among rivals, or indirectly, by 
foreclosing rivals from the market. There are no other 
alternatives; explanations of why a restraint violates article 101(1) 
TFEU must fit into one of the two theories.25 This is true also for 
all intrabrand restraints, including RPM; they typically can be 
found to restrict competition only if there is evidence that they 
facilitate collusion, although the possibility of exclusionary effects 
of RPM cannot be completely ruled out.26 
 
about market power); see also O2 (Germany), [2006] E.C.R. II-1231, ¶ 79 (“[A]n 
examination in this respect was necessary not only for the purposes of granting an 
exemption but, prior to that, for the purposes of the economic analysis of the effects of 
the agreement on the competitive situation determining the applicability of Article 81 
EC [article 101 TFEU].”). 
23. Guidelines on Application of Article 81(3), 2004 O.J. C 101/08, at 99. The 
Commission has confirmed this interpretation of article 101 in the draft guidelines on 
horizontal agreements. See European Commission, Draft Guidelines on the Applicability 
of Article 101 on the Functioning of the European Union to Horizontal Co-operation 
Agreements, SEC(2010) 528/2, at 10, ¶¶ 25–26 (May 4, 2010) [hereinafter Draft 
Guidelines on Horizontal Agreements] (connecting the notion of "restriction of 
competition" with likely effects on price, output, and other parameters of competition). 
24. Some authors who developed thoughtful approaches to article 101 TFEU 
(article 81(1) EC) analysis under an “effects”-based approach appeared to assume that 
object-based analysis is something completely different. See Okeoghene Odudu, 
Interpreting Article 81(1): The Object Requirement Revisited, 26 EUR. L. REV. 379, 379–90 
(2001) (suggesting that “restriction by object” is not related to a presumption of 
harmful effects). 
25. In this view, market power becomes not only an organizing principle to develop 
a theory of harm and organize relevant evidence, but also a limiting principle that imposes 
discipline on decision makers. One cannot use alternative standards such as “restriction 
of economic freedom,” “consumer choice,” or “structure of competition,” as substitutes 
when a consumer welfare standard would make it too difficult for agencies to win cases 
or because of intellectual laziness. 
26. RPM could be used by a powerful supplier to foreclose rival products on the 
retail level by reinforcing an exclusive dealing arrangement. See Leegin Creative Leather 
Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 894 (2007); Timothy J. Brennan, RPM as 
Exclusion: Did the U.S. Supreme Court Stumble Upon the Missing Theory of Harm, 53 
ANTITRUST BULL. 967, 974 (2008). Exclusionary effects of RPM are arguably a greater 
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B. “Object” and “Effect” Analysis Rely on Different Types of Evidence 
The emphasis on market power as the yardstick in article 
101(1) TFEU (article 81(1) EC) does not determine the nature 
and amount of evidence that must be presented in each case to 
satisfy a decision-maker that an agreement is in fact a restriction 
of competition. Such a decision must be evidence-based, but it 
will not be necessary in every case to obtain and evaluate case-
specific evidence of actual or probable anticompetitive effects, 
based on a comparison with the counterfactual without the 
restrictive agreement.27 
If evidence from the same type of restraint, experience in 
case law, and consistent economic theory support the conclusion 
that a certain restraint will almost invariably enable firms to 
increase their market power and harm consumer welfare, an 
economics-based competition regime should maintain 
presumptions of unlawfulness and quickly condemn such 
restraints.28 In other words, restraints that have already been 
“convicted in the court of consumer welfare”29 can and should be 
considered potentially highly harmful without full analysis of 
their effects in a specific case. Experience, empirical findings, 
and consistent theory are critical to justify the use of a 
presumption, and cannot be replaced by judicial fiat or the 
strongly held beliefs of a government official. This approach is 
 
and more realistic concern when powerful retailers instigate RPM schemes by their 
suppliers in order to exclude rival retailers or to raise their costs. See, e.g., Babyage.com, 
Inc. v. Toys “R” Us, Inc. 558 F. Supp. 2d 575, 579 (E.D. Pa. 2008) (considering a case in 
which plaintiff retailers alleged an RPM scheme involving suppliers and a powerful 
retailer). 
27. For a fuller analysis of the choice between strict rules and fuller examination of 
facts, see Arndt Christiansen & Wolfgang Kerber, Competition Policy with Optimally 
Differentiated Rules Instead of “Per se Rules vs Rule of Reason”, 2 J. COMP. L. & ECON. 215, 
238–39 (2006) (identifying criteria that a competition regime should use to decide 
whether stricter rules or more flexible analytical approaches are appropriate). See also 
Ralph A. Winter, Rejoinder to Froeb, O’Brien, and Vita’s Reply, 2 COMPETITION POL’Y INT’L 
196–97 (2006) (defending the position that case-by-case assessment of restraint is 
required where a restraint like RPM theoretically can have beneficial and harmful effects 
and rejecting the argument that a broader rule legitimizing RPM should be adopted).  
28. See, e.g., Timothy J. Muris, The Rule of Reason After California Dental 7–8 (George 
Mason University School of Law, Working Paper No. 00-41, 2000), available at 
http://www.law.gmu.edu/assets/files/publications/working_papers/00-41.pdf 
(emphasizing the importance of experience with a particular practice for formulation of 
an appropriate analytical approach). 
29. Polygram Holding, Inc. v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 416 F.3d 29, 37 (D.C. Cir. 
2005). 
  
2010] RESALE PRICE MAINTENANCE AND ARTICLE 101 1309 
consistent with the “restriction by object” analytical route of 
article 101(1) TFEU, which is based on a presumption that a 
certain restraint has anticompetitive effects.30 
If the plaintiff relies on a “restriction by effect” analysis it 
must present case-specific evidence of actual or probable 
anticompetitive effects. Even in these cases, however, evidentiary 
requirements can be abbreviated so that a plaintiff can show that 
an agreement “restricts competition” with more limited, 
circumstantial evidence. As before, case experience and 
consistent economic theory will be required to justify such an 
abbreviated analysis, as they must be used to persuade the 
decision maker that the circumstantial evidence is a good proxy 
for competitive harm.31 
The challenge for any antitrust regime is to identify the type 
of restrictions where shortcuts and presumptions can be used to 
establish likely harmful effects. As some commentators have 
called it, the challenge is to find the “optimal complexity” of 
rules that allows shortcuts and presumptions.32 
C. “Object” and “Effect” Analysis Do not Represent Radically Different 
Categories  
In developing an analytical framework under article 101 
TFEU (article 81 EC), one should be careful not to over 
analogize to U.S.-style analysis under section 1 of the Sherman 
Act.33 But one valuable lesson from the U.S. experience is that 
attempts to pigeonhole all restraints into two distinct analytical 
modes will fail. There are just too many variations among the 
panoply of possible restraints. This makes the use of easy labels 
 
30. See Guidelines on Application of Article 81(3), 2004 O.J. C 101/08, at 100. If 
presumptions or “object analysis” are used in this way, they do not represent a form-
based approach; rather, they represent an effects-based approach with very limited case-
specific evidence. 
31. See discussion infra notes 38–42 and accompanying text (demonstrating that in 
certain information exchange cases, only certain proxies might be used as evidence of 
effects). 
32. The initial categorization will depend primarily on the likelihood of harm 
caused by certain restrictions, the marginal benefits from introducing more 
differentiated rules, and increased compliance and enforcement costs that will result 
from more complex standards of assessment. See Christiansen & Kerber, supra note 27, 
at 239 (emphasizing the need to use economic principles to develop a set of 
differentiated competition rules).  
33. See Sherman Antitrust Act § 1, 15. U.S.C. § 1 (2006). 
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impossible, and forces decision makers to assess evidentiary 
requirements in light of economic principles and the need to 
ensure reduced costs of compliance and enforcement. 
Although labels may be convenient, the more accurate view 
is that the difference between “restriction by object” and 
“restriction by effect” does not reflect two entirely separate 
analytical standards. It would be incorrect to assume that article 
101 TFEU has only two diametrically opposed analytical routes: 
one that is inflexible and never requires any scrutiny of the 
circumstances in which an agreement occurs, and another that 
always requires a full-blown analysis in which an elaborate 
examination of relevant markets, market power, and 
anticompetitive effects is required—a standard that plaintiffs 
invariably are unable to provide. Rather, these two approaches 
represent two poles at each end of a spectrum that cover more 
nuanced analytical approaches in between. 
The Court of First Instance’s judgment in GlaxoSmithKline I 
is a good example that illustrates that there may be instances 
where some limited inquiry into the circumstances of a case 
might be required to determine whether a restraint should be 
considered under the “restriction by object” approach.34 As the 
Commission’s Guidelines on Application of Article 81(3) also 
suggests, the plaintiff may have to provide some evidence to 
support its theory of harm in certain “restriction by object” cases 
before a decision maker can decide that the restraint presumably 
restricts competition.35 
On the other hand, it is not possible to determine generally 
for all “restriction by effect” cases how much of an inquiry into 
the facts will be required before a decision maker can determine 
that a restraint (likely) will have the effect of reducing output or 
 
34. GlaxoSmithKline I, [2006] E.C.R. II-2969, ¶ 119 (concluding that an 
examination of circumstances of the agreement would be required before confirming 
that the agreement designed to limit parallel trade had the object of restricting 
competition). Although the ECJ reversed the CFI’s article 101(1) TFEU (article 81(1) 
EC) analysis in GlaxoSmithKline, it held only that the CFI’s analytical approach, which 
engaged in a limited factual analysis before presuming that an agreement restricted 
competition, was wrong in light of the facts of the case; the ECJ did not find that the 
CFI’s approach was inappropriate for purposes of article 101(1) TFEU analysis in 
general. See GlaxoSmithKline II, [2009] 4 C.M.L.R. 2, ¶¶ 55, 58. 
35. See Guidelines on Application of Article 81(3), 2004 O.J. C 101/08, at 100 
(confirming that in some “restrictions by object” cases a limited analysis of broader 
circumstances may be required). 
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increasing price. In certain circumstances, an examination of 
limited evidence and the plaintiff’s theory of harm can support 
the finding of a restriction of competition, in particular where an 
agreement has already been implemented and there is some 
evidence of harmful effects. Article 101(1) TFEU (article 81(1) 
EC) analysis can incorporate more easily observable proxies to 
establish the likelihood of harmful effects, so long as experience 
suggests that they are legitimate and reasonably good predictors 
of anticompetitive effects. This point can be illustrated with 
European case law on information exchanges among competitors 
and the analytical framework that was used in various cases to 
condemn information exchanges as anticompetitive.36 
Information exchange cases serve as a good illustration in 
the debate on the proper analytical standards to evaluate RPM 
because the two areas raise very similar competitive concerns: the 
ability of rivals to exercise market power by more effectively 
coordinating their conduct and decreasing rivalry among them. 
There has been widespread discussion on whether information 
exchange cases should be analyzed under a “restriction by effect” 
or “restriction by object” approach. In the end, though, the 
analytical approach adopted in a specific case has little impact on 
evidentiary requirements or case outcomes. A good example is a 
recent OECD roundtable on information exchanges where 
member countries presented their enforcement experiences and 
seemingly adopted opposing positions concerning the 
appropriate analytical framework under article 101 TFEU.37 The 
United Kingdom described its intervention in the Independent 
School case where private schools had engaged over many years in 
a regular, highly organized exchange of tuition information right 
around the time when the schools determined tuition rates for 
the coming school year.38 The United Kingdom explained that 
under the specific circumstances of the case that it was justified 
 
36. See, e.g., Stefano Grassani, Oligopolies and ‘Pure’ Information Exchanges in the EU: 
New Crops Are Growing on the Soils Plowed by ‘UK Tractors,’ in 2007 FORDHAM 
COMPETITION L. INST. 675, 682–83 (Barry E. Hawk ed., 2008) (providing an overview of 
European case law on information exchanges). 
37. See Org. for Econ. Co-operation and Dev. [OECD], Facilitating Practices in 
Oligopolies 2007, at 17–157, OECD Doc. DAF/COMP(2008)24 (Sept. 5, 2008). 
38. See id. at 148; see also Office of Fair Trading [OFT], Exchange of Information 
on Future Fees by Certain Independent Fee-Paying Schools, at 22, Decision No. 
CA98/05/2006 (Nov. 20, 2006) (U.K.) [hereinafter OFT Independent School 
Decision]. 
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to rely on a “restriction by object” approach, thereby enabling it 
to condemn the practice without proof of actual harmful effect.39 
France, however, rejected the use of a “restriction by object” 
approach and insisted that it would always analyze information 
exchange cases under a “restriction by effect” approach.40 It 
described how it had approached, among others, the Paris 
Luxury Hotels case in which a small number of top class luxury 
hotels engaged in an exchange of historic information on price 
and occupancy rates.41 France explained how it had used limited, 
circumstantial evidence on the regularity of meetings, market 
conditions, and the type of information exchanged to conclude 
that the scheme “likely” had the effect of restricting 
competition.42 
Despite the use of different labels, the approach in both 
jurisdictions was almost identical. In both cases, the competition 
authorities identified a number of relevant factors as indirect 
evidence that the investigated practices were harmful. Neither 
case attempted to assess or measure the actual effects of the 
information exchange by establishing a counterfactual without 
the information exchange.43 The only difference between the two 
cases was that the U.K. case, despite the large number of 
participants in the information exchange agreement, had a more 
credible story about how the exchange of information could 
 
39. OECD, supra note 37, at 103, 148 (written contribution by the United Kingdom 
providing a fuller account of Independent School case). Although the Office of Fair 
Trading’s (“OFT”) decision made no findings concerning the effects of the 
arrangement, there was apparently some evidence that the arrangement had resulted in 
higher tuition fees. E.g., OFT Independent School Decision, supra note 38, at 113–14. 
40. OECD, supra note 37, at 46, 148–49 (explaining that the French competition 
authority’s practice in information exchange cases reflected evidentiary standards 
consistent with a “restriction by effect” approach). 
41. See id. at 43 (describing the decision of the Conseil de la concurrence, France’s 
competition authority, in the Paris Luxury case); see also Conseil de la concurrence 
[Competition Council], Décision relative à des pratiques mises en œuvre sur le marché 
des palaces parisiens [Decision on Practices Implemented in the Market for Luxury 
Hotels in Paris], no. 5-D-64 (Nov. 25, 2005) (Fr.). 
42. See OECD, supra note 37, at 43–44. 
43. For a U.S. case applying a similar approach to an information exchange 
arrangement, although during a preliminary stage of the case, see Todd v. Exxon Corp., 
275 F.3d 191, 191 (2d Cir. 2001) (reversing the dismissal of a complaint alleging an 
unlawful exchange of information arrangement because the plaintiff had provided a 
plausible definition of relevant market and a sufficient explanation of why market 
characteristics were conducive to a collusive outcome). 
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facilitate future coordination among rivals than the French 
case.44 
This view is also consistent with the approach that the 
European Court of Justice’s (now the Court of Justice of the 
European Union) (“ECJ”) endorsed in U.K. Tractors45 and T-
Mobile Netherlands.46 U.K. Tractors was litigated under a 
“restriction by effect” theory, and the ECJ confirmed that a 
careful evaluation of the circumstances in which an information 
exchange occurred can be sufficient to establish a violation of 
article 101(1) TFEU and that evidence of actual anticompetitive 
effects was not always required.47 In T-Mobile Netherlands, the ECJ 
decided that a “restriction by object” approach can be applied to 
certain information exchanges, but it nevertheless identified a 
number of circumstances that must be used to explain why the 
information exchange scheme presumably restricts competition, 
such as the market structure, number of competitors, and the 
nature of the information exchanged.48 In T-Mobile Netherlands, 
the ECJ may have elevated the checklist approach too high and 
required too little in terms of a meaningful story that connects 
the relevant factors, but hopefully the requirement to develop a 
story will become clearer over time. This would also be more 
consistent with the ECJ’s approach in recent merger cases.49 
 
44. See Oligopolies and Competition Law, in 2007 FORDHAM COMPETITION L. INST., 
supra note 36, at 769, 811 (statement by Damien Neven, Chief Economist of the 
Commission’s Directorate General for Competition, questioning the strength of theory 
of harm in Paris Luxury Hotel). 
45. John Deere, Ltd. v. Commission, Case C-7/95, [1998] E.C.R. I-3111, ¶ 76. 
46. T-Mobile Netherlands BV v. Raad van Bestuur van de Nederlandse 
Mededingingsautoriteit, [2009] 5 C.M.L.R. 1701. 
47. See John Deere, [1998] E.C.R. I-3111, ¶¶ 72–78, 90. 
48. See T-Mobile Netherlands, [2009] 5 C.M.L.R. at 1740. This approach to analytical 
standards used in information exchanges is also consistent with the Commission's draft 
Horizontal Co-operation Guidelines. See Draft Guidelines on Horizontal Agreements, 
supra note 23, SEC(2010) 528/2, at 19, ¶¶ 68–70 (confirming that for certain exchanges 
of information, a restriction by object analysis may be appropriate after an analysis of a 
few, limited factors, whereas, for other information exchanges, a fuller analysis of 
market conditions and the information exchanged is necessary for a determination of 
whether the information exchange facilitates to coordinated exercise of market power). 
49. The ECJ has warned against adopting a checklist approach to establish the risk 
of coordination among rivals, requiring instead that relevant criteria must be connected 
in a plausible story before they support a finding of a risk of coordination. See 
Bertelsmann and Sony Corporation of America v. Impala, Case C-413/06, [2008] E.C.R. 
I-4951, ¶¶ 125–26 (requiring an explanation on why standard criteria indicating the 
possibility of coordinated effects in merger cases are relevant in the context of a specific 
case). 
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D. Focusing on Market Power Does not Introduce a Rule of Reason 
Analysis 
The article 101(1) TFEU (article 81(1) EC) analytical 
approach advocated herein is not a “rule of reason” analysis. 
More importantly, and more precisely, the discussion on how 
market power concerns fit into article 101(1) TFEU analysis does 
not benefit from arguments that this approach would introduce a 
“rule of reason” analysis into European competition law. One 
can argue in favor of an effects-based analysis in all article 101 
TFEU cases along the lines suggested above and at the same time 
subscribe to the notion that European competition law does not 
use a “rule of reason” analysis. 
References to the “rule of reason” are not helpful because 
the concept means different things to different people. A “rule 
of reason” approach can refer to the analysis of restrictive 
agreements identified by the U.S. Supreme Court in Chicago 
Board of Trade where essentially everything is considered relevant, 
and factors both supporting and opposing the finding of an 
unlawful agreement are examined without a clear analytical 
structure or sequence.50 Article 101 TFEU does not, and should 
not, incorporate this type of rule of reason analysis. Courts in 
Europe are settled on this issue.51 
For others, “rule of reason” analysis is an analytical 
framework that allows the defendant at some point in the analysis 
to bring efficiency justifications into the analysis.52 Article 101 
TFEU has always had a “rule of reason” analysis in this narrow 
sense that defendants are not barred from raising justifications 
 
50. Bd. of Trade of the City of Chicago v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238–39 
(1918). 
51. See, e.g., Métropole Télévision (M6) v. Commission, Case T-112/99, [2001] 
E.C.R. II-2459, ¶¶ 72, 76, 107. It should be noted, though, that this approach also does 
not reflect the current analytical framework applied to restrictive agreements in U.S. 
antitrust law. See, e.g., Nat’l Coll. Athletic Assoc. v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 
468 U.S. 85, 103 (1984) (applying an abbreviated rule of reason analysis); see also 
Polygram Holding, Inc. v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 416 F.3d 29, 34 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (same). 
52. See generally Thomas G. Krattenmaker, Per Se Violations in Antitrust Law: 
Confusing Offenses with Defenses, 77 GEO. L.J. 165 (1988) (arguing that courts should 
abandon the notion of per se violations and focus instead on categorizing certain 
defenses as per se inadmissible). See also Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting 
Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 19–23 (1979) (rejecting the per se condemnation of horizontal 
agreement excluding price competition where the defendant presented strong and 
credible efficiency justifications). 
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for their conduct under article 101(3) TFEU.53 This narrow view 
of what “rule of reason” means, however, says nothing about the 
structure of the analysis, the use of initial presumptions, nor the 
possibility of using a structured rule of reason analysis that 
reaches initial conclusions about the likely anticompetitive effects 
of an agreement based on a few proxies that shift the burden to 
provide justifications to the defendant. Accordingly, and as other 
commentators have already noted, Europe would be much better 
off if the debate about the proper analytical standards in article 
101 TFEU stayed away from using the—unhelpful—“rule of 
reason” label.54 
II. IDENTIFYING STEPS TOWARDS AN IMPROVED 
FRAMEWORK FOR RPM ANALYSIS UNDER ARTICLE 101 TFEU 
A. Economics of RPM  
A useful analytical framework for RPM cannot be developed 
without regard to the economics of RPM. The economic 
assessment of RPM occurs on two levels: (1) as regards to the 
concepts and theory of RPM, there is little debate and 
widespread agreement; (2) as regards to the empirical evidence 
on the competitive effects of RPM, there is little agreement and 
significant debate even among mainstream economists. 
On a conceptual level, the potential benefits and harm 
related to RPM are largely undisputed; newer research is 
emerging, but it does not appear to undermine the general 
consensus on core principles. On the positive side of the ledger, 
it is widely recognized that RPM strategies can be used to protect 
retail margins in order to better align incentives of suppliers and 
retailers so that the retailer will promote sales of the supplier’s 
products more effectively than without RPM; this will make the 
supplier a more effective competitor against rival brands and 
 
53. See Matra Hachette SA v. Commission, Case T-17/93, [1994] E.C.R. II-595, 596–
97. Certain justifications would not be legally cognizable, though, such as the attempt to 
make more money through naked price fixing. In such a case, article 101 TFEU (article 
81 EC) comes close to a per se prohibition. See TFEU, supra note 7, art. 101, 2008 O.J. C. 
115/47, at 88; EC Treaty, supra note 7, art. 81, 2006 O.J. C 321 E/37, at 73. 
54. See, e.g., Richard Whish & Brenda Sufrin, Article 85 and the Rule of Reason, 7 Y.B. 
EUR. L. 1, 36 (1987). 
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stimulate interbrand competition.55 Benefits of RPM can also 
include the inducement to provide product “quality 
certification,” to reduce free riding opportunities, and 
encourage retailers to invest in new products. On the negative 
side, RPM can be used to support collusion on the supplier level 
and the retailer level, or at least soften price competition among 
them. More recent literature has attempted to identify different 
conditions under which RPM can bring about these effects.56 
The probabilities assigned to these positive and negative 
outcomes, however, continue to be highly controversial among 
economists and other commentators,57 as the frequency and 
magnitude of the effects of RPM remain largely unexplored. In 
other words, while there is agreement on what can happen if a 
supplier uses RPM, there is disagreement on how likely it is that 
something bad or good will happen. 
Different opinions and beliefs on empirical issues largely 
explain why some economists are skeptical toward RPM while 
others are more relaxed. Many economists would concur with the 
statement that, “it is fair to say that no serious economist doubts 
the pros. The cons can be regarded as rare and hence the 
balance would be in favor of allowing RPM in many 
circumstances.”58 Yet, many others would agree that “RPM is, if 
 
55. See, e.g., Benjamin Klein, Competitive Resale Price Maintenance in the Absence 
of Free-Riding 5–6 (Apr. 3, 2009) (unpublished), available at http://cdn.law.ucla.edu/
sitecollectiondocuments/workshops%20and%20colloquia%202/klein,%20leow.pdf 
(emphasizing that this rationale does not rely on free rider justifications); see also 
Matthew Bennett et al., Resale Price Maintenance: Explaining the Controversy, and Small Steps 
Towards a More Nuanced Policy, in INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST LAW & POLICY: FORDHAM 
COMPETITION LAW 2009, ch. 19 (Barry Hawk ed., 2010), reprinted in 33 FORDHAM INT’L 
L.J. 1278, 1288–90 (2010); OECD, Roundtable on Resale Price Maintenance 2008, at 23–
30, OECD Doc. DAF/COMP(2008)37 (Sept. 10, 2009) (summarizing the procompetitive 
rationales for RPM). 
56. See, e.g., OECD, supra note 55, at 30–36. Newer research seeking to identify 
additional circumstances in which RPM can have harmful, collusive effects appears to 
have gained support in particular among European economists. For an overview, see, for 
example, Bennett et al., supra note 55, at 1290–92. There is a question, however, 
whether the emerging research and the assumptions under which harmful effects of 
RPM are predicted to occur have been sufficiently tested in a rigorous debate, in order 
to provide guidance for the development of legal rules. 
57. See, e.g., Margaret E. Slade, The Effects of Vertical Restraints: An Evidence Based 
Approach, in THE PROS AND CONS OF VERTICAL RESTRAINTS, supra note 11, at 12. 
58. OECD, supra note 55, at 264 (paraphrasing professor of economics Howard 
Marvel). 
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anything, slightly closer to [per se illegality of a restraint] than 
[legality].”59 
Optimal legal rules and analytical approaches that ensure 
case outcomes that are consistent with economic goals cannot be 
shaped without an understanding of the empirical aspects of 
RPM, which can be obtained only through case experience and 
research that connects theory and empirical work.60 In particular, 
strict rules—either declaring all RPM beneficial or all RPM 
anticompetitive—cannot be supported without some idea how 
the empirical questions should be answered because the 
presumptions that underlie strict rules lack critical support.61 
Given the uncertainties in RPM economics, the only reasonable 
alternative is an approach that allows for some consideration of 
case-specific facts.62 
B. Commission’s Re-Adopted Rules Concerning RPM 
According to the new block exemption on vertical restraints, 
RPM will continue to be considered a “hardcore” restraint, which 
usually cannot meet the criteria under article 101(3) TFEU 
(article 81 EC),63 even though the corresponding guidelines 
appear to open the door a little to certain efficiency defenses 
related to market entry.64 Thus, as much as this is possible under 
article 101 TFEU, the practice remains a per se infringement. At 
the very least, the public perception that RPM de facto is 
prohibited per se, which has been nurtured over many years by 
 
59. Bennett et al., supra note 55, at 1287. 
60. See, e.g., Michael Baye et al., Economics at the FTC: The Google-DoubleClick Merger, 
Resale Price Maintenance, Mortgage Disclosures, and Credit Scoring in Auto Insurance, 33 REV. 
INDUS. ORG. 211, 218 (2008) (emphasizing the importance of empirical evidence to 
develop a structured analysis in RPM cases). 
61. See Christiansen & Kerber, supra note 27, at 238–39 (concluding that strict rules 
for RPM cannot be adopted in the absence of sufficient general empirical evidence 
about the effects of RPM). 
62. See, e.g., Winter, supra note 27, at 197. 
63. See Block Exemption on Vertical Agreements, No. 330/2010, art. 4(a), 2010 
O.J. L 102/1, at 5; see also TFEU, supra note 7, art. 101(3), 2008 O.J. C 115/47, at 88–89; 
EC Treaty, supra note 7, art. 81(3), 2006 O.J. C 321 E, at 74. 
64. See Guidelines on Vertical Restraints, 2010 O.J. C 130/1, at 44 (recognizing the 
potential efficiencies of RPM, although limited to new entry, coordinated low price 
campaigns, and the prevention of a large distributor from using a branded product as 
loss leader). 
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Commission practice and policy statements,65 will continue to 
exist unless a body of case law emerges with a robust assessment 
of RPM efficiencies and realistic evidentiary thresholds. 
As a result, the strict rules against RPM were grandfathered 
in while Europe moved toward a more consumer-welfare-
oriented competition regime. Given the rich discussion on RPM 
in Europe since Leegin,66 it is disappointing that the Commission, 
the institution with the principal responsibility for developing 
competition policy,67 has decided to play it safe and maintain the 
existing legal framework for RPM with only marginal changes 
that will have little, if any, practical effect. 
The Commission’s justifications for the categorization of 
RPM as a “hardcore” violation, found in the new guidelines, do 
not meet the requirements in an economics-based competition 
regime identified above.68 The guidelines offer only a short list of 
scenarios in which RPM can have harmful effects, focusing—with 
one exception—on horizontal effects on the supplier or retail 
level.69 While this description of economic theory is 
uncontroversial, it is insufficient to support the proposed rules. 
 
65. See discussion supra note 27 and accompanying text. The Commission has never 
recognized possible efficiencies in an RPM case. Moreover, Commission documents and 
public statements by Commission officials strongly suggested that efficiency defenses 
would not be recognized in RPM cases. See, e.g., 2000 Guidelines on Vertical Restraints, 
2000 O.J. C 291/1, at 11 (stating categorically that exemptions for hard core restraints 
are unlikely); OECD, supra note 55, at 103 (summarizing statement by a Commission 
official that parties have never come up with convincing efficiency explanations); see also 
Jones, supra note 17, at 761 (concluding that RPM is “essentially prohibited per se”); 
Luc Peeperkorn, Resale Price Maintenance and its Alleged Efficiencies, 4 EUR. COMPETITION 
J. 201, 203 (2008) (observing that “[i]t is also considered that RPM will not have positive 
effects or that, where efficiencies are likely to result, these will not be passed on to 
consumers and/or that RPM is not indispensable for creating these efficiencies”). 
66. See generally, e.g., THE PROS AND CONS OF VERTICAL RESTRAINTS, supra note 11. 
67. See TFEU, supra note 7, art. 105, O.J. C 115/47, at 88–92; EC Treaty, supra note 
7, art. 85, 2006 O.J. C 321 E, at 76. 
68. See supra note 60 and accompanying text. The focus of this Essay is RPM. But 
similar concerns apply equally, and perhaps even more strongly, to the Commission’s 
plan to maintain, and in some respects tighten, the rules on selective distribution 
regimes and in particular online distribution. Not only is the distinction between active 
and passive sales detached from economic principles, the entire set of rules on selective 
distribution is completely disconnected from the concept of market power. As in the 
case of the proposed RPM rules, the proposed approach to selective distribution might 
actually harm competition as it extends certain prohibitions to small firms that may 
benefit the most from more flexible rules that allow them to control the distribution of 
their products and compete more effectively with larger incumbents. 
69. Guidelines on Vertical Restraints, 2010 O.J. C 130/1, at 21. 
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The guidelines do not attempt to explain how frequent the 
scenarios are in which RPM might have harmful effects 
compared to scenarios where the effects would be benign or pro-
competitive, and also conveniently ignore any attempt to quantify 
the harmful effects of RPM. The guidelines do not, and cannot, 
rely on any case law experience that would support the proposed 
rules as no Commission or court decision appears to have ever 
included factual findings on the harmful effects of RPM.70 
The guidelines also attempt to justify the “hardcore” 
categorization of RPM in the block exemption regulation by 
arguing that RPM leads to higher prices and therefore is 
presumably unlawful.71 This argument is wrong on the facts and 
wrong on the law. First, RPM does not always lead to a price 
increase. A supplier implementing an RPM scheme seeks to 
protect a retailer’s margin; so it may be able to achieve that goal 
by lowering its wholesale price when its products are exposed to 
strong competition on the retail level.72 Second, and more 
importantly, even if a supplier’s distribution scheme leads to a 
higher price for its own product, this effect is not necessarily 
indicative of harm to consumer welfare. As other commentators 
have explained in greater detail, a supplier has no incentive to 
raise the margin for retailers, and therefore the distribution cost 
for its own products, unless it gets something in return that 
makes this strategy profitable.73 Absent collusive effects that allow 
suppliers to jointly exercise market power, the benefit must come 
in the form of increased efforts by the retailer to sell the 
supplier’s products, compared to a situation of unrestricted 
retailer price competition. If so, an RPM scheme will increase 
output and benefit for at least some consumers.74 A decision 
 
70. Case experience with a fuller investigation of the effects of RPM could have 
come from national authorities. 
71. Guidelines on Vertical Restraints, 2010 O.J. C 130/1, at 44. 
72. See, e.g., OECD, supra note 55, at 267 (statement by the United States). 
73. See, e.g., Frank Mathewson & Ralph Winter, The Law and Economics of Resale Price 
Maintenance, 13 REV. INDUS. ORG. 57, 67 (1998). If a supplier believed that it was 
profitable simply to raise retail prices (without any corresponding output enhancing 
benefit) it could raise wholesale prices so it could obtain all of the additional profits, 
rather than sharing them with the retailer. 
74. If output and price increase, the effects on consumer welfare are ambiguous, 
and using consumer welfare as a standard to determine liability will be extremely 
difficult or impossible. See, e.g., Roger D. Blair, The Demise of Dr. Miles: Some Troubling 
Consequences, 53 ANTITRUST BULL. 133, 143–46 (2008) (explaining the possible effects of 
an RPM scheme that increases promotional efforts and output on consumer surplus). 
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maker observing higher prices as a result of RPM can conclude 
nothing about whether or not the RPM scheme produced gains 
in efficiency.75 In other words, a higher price that results only 
from a vertical arrangement is not a useful proxy to discriminate 
between procompetitive effects and anticompetitive effects; more 
bluntly, “a price test is completely useless” for the development 
of a policy toward RPM.76 It cannot support a presumption that 
RPM restricts competition. 
The price explanation in the guidelines to categorize RPM 
as a “hardcore” violation is also arguably inconsistent with 
European law. In Metro I the ECJ held that a supplier’s unilateral, 
vertical strategy designed to increase promotional efforts at the 
retail level does not fall under article 101(1) TFEU (article 81(1) 
EC) even if it leads to higher retail prices for the supplier’s 
products.77 The court accepted the link between higher retail 
margins and consumer benefits from increased promotional 
efforts and found it lawful for a supplier to unilaterally adopt 
strategies that might lead to higher retail prices.78 In Metro II the 
ECJ complemented its earlier decision by highlighting that 
vertical strategies designed to increase promotional efforts and a 
product’s quality image will raise competition concerns only if 
 
Thus, it may be preferable to use output effects as a standard to distinguish between 
lawful and unlawful RPM, even if output effects might not always accurately reflect 
effects on consumer welfare. See id. at 148; see also Howard P. Marvel, Resale Price 
Maintenance and the Rule of Reason, ANTITRUST SOURCE, June 2008, at 1, 2–3 (suggesting 
that the output test might be useful to distinguish good RPM practices from bad RPM 
practices). 
75. See Marvel, supra note 74, at 3. 
76. Blair, supra note 74, at 147; see also Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, 
Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 895–97 (2007) (rejecting the argument that higher prices resulting 
from RPM justify quick condemnation of the practice). 
77. See Metro SB-Großmarkte GmbH v. Commission (Metro I), Case 26/76, [1977] 
E.C.R. 1875, ¶ 21. The case also forecloses the argument that a “restriction on 
competition” in article 101(1) TFEU (article 81(1) EC) should be assessed in light of 
lessened consumer choice or of revealed preferences of some consumers for lower 
prices, as the court accepted that a supplier may avoid low price distribution channels 
for its products by imposing costly obligations on its retailers even though this strategy 
lessened consumer choice as some consumers certainly would have preferred to buy the 
supplier's product in a discount store at the lower price. The case shows that a supplier 
strategy that focuses on improving the tradeoff between price and service/quality and 
denies certain consumers the opportunity to buy the supplier’s product at a lower price 
is lawful under article 101(1) TFEU. 
78. See id. (confirming that a suppliers' distribution strategies designed to eliminate 
discount ditributors and therefore soften price competition for its own products fall 
outside article 101(1)). 
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they have recognizable horizontal effects such as softening 
competition among suppliers.79 Metro I and Metro II rule out the 
notion that higher prices resulting from RPM support a 
“hardcore” classification. 
The guidelines also do not attempt to explain why it would 
be too difficult and costly to design rules that reasonably 
distinguish between harmful RPM and cases where RPM creates 
efficiencies accurately. Even commentators who tend to be 
skeptical of some instances of RPM recognize that situations exist 
where RPM does create efficiencies,80 which suggests that it 
would be desirable to develop analytical approaches that can 
reliably identify these situations. There is also no explanation for 
how an RPM strategy by a relatively small firm in a competitive 
market and without substantial market power (regardless of 
whether the small firm is a new entrant) can have any of the 
collusive effects that the guidelines mention, and why it would be 
so costly and difficult to use some market power screen to 
identify such situations.81 
This is the greatest weakness of the Commission’s 
approach—although economic research and the limited 
empirical evidence available to date make it clear that it is 
impossible to assume that RPM schemes almost invariably harm 
consumer welfare,82 the “blacklisting” of RPM perpetuates a 
situation where RPM schemes will not be seriously examined. 
Given the institutional and procedural framework for article 101 
TFEU enforcement in Europe,83 it will never be necessary for a 
plaintiff or competition authority to gather and present facts 
required for a competitive effects assessment in RPM cases; in 
 
79. See Metro SB-Großmarkte GmbH v. Commission (Metro II), Case 75/84, [1986] 
E.C.R. 3021, ¶¶ 40–41. 
80. See, e.g., OECD, supra note 55, at 278 (paraphrasing Bruno Jullien as opining 
that efficiencies associated with RPM will benefit consumers if upstream structures 
compete). 
81. The proposed rules raise a series of other questions, including the justification 
for the sharp distinction between strategies that do not directly use price restraints to 
limit intrabrand competition, which are de facto lawful for firms below the market share 
threshold, and price restraints which are banned. They are both designed to accomplish 
the same thing, and sometimes “nonprice” restraints can provide more opportunity to 
exercise market power than RPM. The distinction between price and nonprice restraints 
is not as relevant as the Commission would suggest; it is too broad and too narrow as a 
basis upon which to categorize practices. 
82. They equally do not suggest that RPM is almost invariably a good thing. 
83. See Blair, supra note 72, at 149–50. 
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fact, it would be strategically unwise to include any assertions 
about competitive effects in a case or decision. This will inhibit a 
process where competition authorities and courts have the 
opportunity to better understand the effects of RPM and shape 
legal analysis accordingly, even though everyone agrees that 
there are realistic scenarios in which RPM cannot support 
collusive or exclusionary outcomes. Therefore, it will not be 
possible to develop criteria that can be applied to identify 
instances where the law should permit RPM.84 Moreover, the 
Commission has in the past been so unreceptive to efficiency 
justifications that the characterization of RPM as a “hardcore” 
violation will be outcome determinative.85 
C. Principles for an Improved Article 101 Analysis of RPM 
1. Structuring Article 101(1) Analysis Around Indicia of 
Harmful Effects of RPM 
There is little doubt that a rule that would require every 
plaintiff in an RPM case to provide conclusive evidence on actual 
welfare effects would be unwise, as it would be very difficult and 
many times impossible to produce such evidence, even in cases 
where RPM most likely is harmful. It would also be unnecessarily 
costly, assuming that it is possible to identify criteria that 
reasonably accurately indicate in which situations an RPM 
scheme likely facilitates collusive outcomes. 
The approach applied in many information exchange cases, 
however, could serve as a useful starting point on the route 
towards a better analytical framework for RPM. As described 
above, information exchange cases depend on collusive theories 
of harm like RPM cases.86 In information exchange cases it has 
become an accepted approach to analyze a limited set of factors 
that, according to economic theory and experience, are 
considered reasonably good predictors of whether the practice 
can facilitate coordination and is therefore likely harmful; these 
 
84. See O’Brien, supra note 11, at 43–44 (describing how competition authorities 
should seek to update prior beliefs about the effects of business practices in light of 
empirical evidence); Slade, supra note 57, at 28 (observing that empirical evidence on 
vertical restraints is scant and that more evidence should be gathered). 
85. See Blair, supra note 72, at 149–50. 
86. See discussion supra notes 36–42; see also Grassani, supra note 36, at 682–83.  
  
2010] RESALE PRICE MAINTENANCE AND ARTICLE 101 1323 
factors must then be combined with a plausible explanation into 
a story/theory of harm to persuade a decision maker that article 
101(1) TFEU (article 81(1) EC) was infringed.87 
The most interesting aspect of the debate concerning RPM 
is about whether a similar approach would work in RPM cases 
and whether it could be incorporated into a structured analysis.88 
Some agreement appears to be emerging on potentially useful 
criteria, although much more experience from actual cases will 
be required to determine whether these criteria are sufficient 
and workable.89 The most obvious factor is the absence of market 
power. Where markets are competitive and the firm seeking to 
implement an RPM scheme has no market power, an RPM 
scheme cannot have anticompetitive effects. Another initial 
factor in the decision-making matrix could focus on whether the 
industry generally appears prone to collusion. Additional criteria 
to distinguish harmful from nonharmful RPM include, for 
example, the frequency of RPM in a given industry, the source of 
the restraint (supplier or retailer), and whether the supplier has 
some degree of market power. Largely along the same lines, 
Office of Fair Trading papers have suggested using market 
power, downstream/upstream market concentration, the source 
of RPM, and the frequency of use of RPM in an industry as initial 
screens in an RPM inquiry.90 Similar criteria were applied when 
 
87. How much evidence is required in these cases will depend on whether 
circumstances are more supportive or less supportive of the finding of harmful effects. 
For example, if the information exchange occurs in a highly concentrated industry and 
involves future pricing decisions, much less explanation should be expected from the 
plaintiff to establish why the information exchange facilitated coordination than when a 
plaintiff brings a case against an information exchange in a highly competitive industry 
with many players and the information that was exchanged was historic and excluded 
price. 
88. See, e.g., Christine A. Varney, Assistant Attorney Gen., Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep’t 
of Justice, Antitrust Federalism: Enhancing Federal/State Cooperation 4–14 (Oct. 7, 
2009), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/speeches/250635.pdf (discussing 
the structured rule of reason approach in RPM cases).  
89. It may also be worthwhile exploring whether anything can be learned from the 
analysis of evidence in merger cases involving a coordinated effects theory. Roughly 
speaking, evidence concerning certain characteristics of the industry and evidence that 
show that coordination would likely increase as a result of a merger (whether or not it 
has occurred in the past) must be provided and explained in these cases. 
90. See OECD, supra note 55, at 212 (submission by the United Kingdom). For 
example, if there is evidence that retailers have instigated an RPM scheme, the potential 
efficiencies usually associated with RPM fall away and it would be justified to directly 
require the defendant to provide justifications. 
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the U.S. Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) examined a request 
by Nine West to review an existing consent decree prohibiting it 
from using RPM. After analyzing these factors in an abbreviated 
fashion, the FTC concluded that an RPM scheme implemented 
by Nine West could in principle not be harmful.91 
Ultimately, the goal of European competition law must be to 
develop an analytical framework that incorporates these and 
perhaps other factors that reasonably predict the effects of RPM 
in an article 101(1) TFEU analysis, in order to give plaintiffs a 
reasonably clear roadmap on what they must produce to prevail 
in the article 101(1) TFEU part of a case.92 Whether such an 
approach is labeled “restriction by object,” where the plaintiff 
has to identify certain factors and provide a story of why these 
factors are relevant in the present case before the presumption 
sets in, or “restriction by effect,” where the plaintiff has to 
provide limited evidence under article 101(1) TFEU before the 
burden of proof shifts to the defendant under article 101(3) 
TFEU, is really secondary.93 In either case, it is essential that 
moving toward such a framework is possible only by examining 
cases through experience to identify circumstances where RPM is 
not harmful as well as those likely to cause harm. 
 
91. See In re Nine West Group Inc., 5 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 16,144, 2008 WL 
2061410 (Fed. Trade Comm’n May 6, 2008) (granting in part a petition to reopen and 
modify a previous order by the Federal Trade Commission in light of the Leegin 
decision), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/9810386/080506order.pdf; see also 
Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 897–98 (2007) 
(referring to market concentration and market power, widespread use of RPM in the 
industry, and source of RPM as factors that should be reflected in analysis of RPM). 
92. The Commission is working toward such a framework with respect to other 
practices that might facilitate collusive outcomes. In the draft guidelines on horizontal 
agreements' section on information exchanges, the Commission discusses that a plaintiff 
has to explain how specific market conditions and the type of information exchanged 
can help competitors to coordinate their conduct. See Draft Guidelines on Horizontal 
Agreements, supra note 23, SEC(2010) 528/2, at 19–24, ¶¶ 68–87 (discussing a limited 
set of parameters that can be used to assess the likely effects of information exchanges). 
Because RPM and information exchanges typically involve the same theory of harm—
they facilitate coordination among competitors—one would have expected that the 
analytical standards for RPM should be consistent with those proposed for information 
exchanges. This is not the case now, but eventually the European competition regime 
should move toward greater consistency in the evaluation of practices that facilitate 
coordination among competitors, using the experience in one area to develop better 
analytical standards in other areas such as RPM. 
93. See discussion supra Part I.C. 
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An obvious concern could be that the approach suggested 
above includes too many factors that are unreasonably vague and 
uncertain to be practically workable, and using them in an 
analysis would do more harm than good, compared to the status 
quo. These concerns, however, are not justified. First, some of 
these criteria have already been quite effective in informing 
decisions in RPM cases. Although Leegin is a relatively recent case 
and the experience of lower courts in the United States has been 
limited, there have been several cases where courts made some or 
all of the above factors operative to decide that an RPM scheme 
either could not be harmful or raised serious enough concerns to 
merit a fuller investigation.94 In Leegin, for example, the district 
court on remand dismissed the case because the plaintiff failed to 
provide evidence related to a relevant market and market power 
(the market power screen).95 The district court in Babyage was 
sufficiently concerned about the source of an RPM scheme and 
the industry history to find a closer examination of RPM in the 
toy industry justified.96 The FTC found several of these factors 
useful in a relatively short evaluation of Nine West’s RPM scheme 
as well.97 
Second, European courts have already used the same 
criteria to determine whether certain arrangements are unlawful. 
Market power screens that include at least market definition and 
market share estimates are a standard element of article 101 
cases where the restraint is not considered a “restriction by 
object.”98 Moreover, in Metro II the ECJ held that the lawfulness 
of so-called “selective distribution systems” may depend on the 
 
94. See, e.g., Toledo Mack Sales & Serv., Inc. v. Mack Trucks, Inc., 530 F.3d 204, 
225–26 (3d Cir. 2008); Babyage.com v. Toys “R” Us, 558 F. Supp. 2d 575, 583–84 (E.D. 
Pa. 2008). 
95. PSKS, Inc. v. Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc., 2009-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) ¶ 
76,592, 2009 WL 938561, at *8 (E.D. Tex. Apr. 6, 2009) 
96. Babyage.com, 558 F. Supp. 2d at 581–88 (refusing to dismiss complaint that 
included allegations of an unlawful RPM agreement). 
97. See In re Nine West Group Inc., 5 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 16,144, 2008 WL 
2061410 (Fed. Trade Comm’n May 6, 2008). 
98. See, e.g., O2 (Germany) GmbH v. Commission, Case T-328/03, [2006] E.C.R. II-
1231, ¶ 71; Eur. Night Servs., Ltd. (EPS) v. Commission, Joined Cases T-374–75, 384 & 
388/94, [1998] E.C.R. II-3141, ¶¶ 136–37. Of course, they are standard in other 
enforcement areas also, as single firm conduct cases and merger cases require market 
definition and share estimates. 
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frequency with which the practice occurs in an industry,99 which 
is similar to examining how widespread the use of RPM has 
become. The relatively vague tests formulated in Metro I and 
Metro II on when selective distribution “restricts competition” 
were, until 2004, the main source for firms to evaluate the 
lawfulness of so-called selective distribution systems.100 While 
there has been some litigation since Metro that has helped to 
refine the rules on selective distribution,101 it does not appear 
that the Metro tests were unworkable for market participants. 
One could also be concerned that relying too much on case 
experience to formulate analytical approaches to RPM might 
lead to incorrect results in Europe because of case selection bias. 
As for the foreseeable future, most enforcement in Europe will 
be public enforcement, so there could be a question as to 
whether competition authorities will disproportionately focus on 
cases where RPM likely has harmful effects. Using this type of 
empirical evidence therefore could result in unreasonably strict 
rules against RPM that would not be justified if a more objective 
case sample were used. These concerns, however, do not 
undermine the approach advocated in this Essay. First, when 
evaluating case law experience of competition authorities with a 
view toward formulating the appropriate analytical approach to 
RPM, it would be important to interpret and use available data 
correctly, and consider a possible selection bias rather than 
simply comparing the total numbers of good RPM cases and of 
bad RPM cases. Second, it would also be important to 
periodically obtain information about cases in which a 
competition authority saw no reason to prosecute an RPM case. 
This task would be facilitated by the fact that most competition 
 
99. Metro SB-Großmarkte GmbH v. Commission (Metro II), Case 75/84, [1986] 
E.C.R. 3021, at ¶ 40. 
100. See, e.g., Eur. Night Servs., [1998] E.C.R. II-3141, ¶ 119; Groupement d’Achat 
Édouard Leclerc v. Commission (Yves Saint Laurent), Case T-19/92, [1996] E.C.R. II-
1851, ¶¶ 19, 42–47, 60–82, 90–91, 103, 178–95. 
101. See, e.g., Yves Saint Laurent, [1996] E.C.R. II-1851, ¶¶ 11–16 (identifying 
selection criteria that fall outside the scope of article 101(1) TFEU (article 81(1) EC)); 
Metro SB-Großmärkte GmbH v. Cartier SA, Case C-376/92, [1994] E.C.R. I-15, ¶ 29 
(accepting that luxury watches can justify selective distribution system); ETA Fabriques 
d’Ébauches v. SA DK Investment, Case 31/85, [1985] E.C.R. 3933, ¶ 16 (expressing 
doubts on whether less prestigious watches justify selective distribution systems). The 
fact that the market place has learned to live with the European law on selective 
distribution does of course not mean that the law in this area is based on sound 
economic principles. See supra note 68 and accompanying text. 
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authorities in Europe cannot simply ignore complaints they 
reject, but have an obligation to provide reasons for why they 
declined to pursue the action. Thus, there could be a good 
sample of cases where a competition authority finds that RPM 
was harmless and must provide at least a limited assessment of 
the facts to justify this conclusion. 
The more recent experience in Europe, although limited, 
also suggests that a representative sample of cases would emerge 
in a regime encouraging a fuller assessment in RPM cases than is 
currently required. The competition authorities in France and 
the United Kingdom, for example, have brought several cases 
against RPM schemes found to be harmful because they allegedly 
facilitated coordination on the supplier level.102 These types of 
cases can be used to identify factors that are indicative of harmful 
effects and to consider how these factors can be included in an 
analytical structure for RPM cases.103 Conversely, there have been 
quite a few examples from European jurisdictions where 
competition authorities concluded that RPM cases brought to 
their attention did not raise competitive concerns. Most notably, 
the competition authority in the Netherlands investigated RPM 
cases where it quickly concluded that harm was unlikely.104 A few 
other cases have been reported as well.105 Here, again, a synthesis 
of these cases should provide useful guidance on developing 
criteria for evaluating RPM schemes more generally. 
 
102. See, e.g., Conseil de la concurrence, Décision relative à des pratiques relevées 
dans le secteur de la parfumerie de luxe [Decision on Practices Observed in the Market 
for Luxury Perfumes], no. 06-D-04 bis (Mar. 13, 2006) (Fr.) (concerning luxury 
perfumes); Conseil de la concurrence, Décision relative à saisine de la SARL 
AVANTAGE à l’encontre de pratiques mises en œuvre dans le secteur des produits 
d’électronique grand public [Decision on Referral of the SARL AVANTAGE Against 
Practices Implemented in the Sector of Consumer Electronic Products], no. 05-D-66 
(Dec. 5, 2005) (Fr.) (involving brown goods); Conseil de la concurrence, Décision 
relative à des pratiques mises en œuvre dans le secteur de la distribution de jouets 
[Decision on Practices Implemented in the Distribution of Toys], no. 07-D-50 (Dec. 20, 
2007) (Fr.) (regarding toys); OFT, Decision: Price Fixing of Replica Football Kit, No. 
CA98/06/2003 (Aug. 1, 2003) (U.K.) (involving an agreement on aspects of horizontal 
and vertical price fixing). 
103. The U.K. study on book markets after binding book prices were prohibited 
also provides some insight, although its usefulness might be limited to suggesting that an 
industry-wide RPM scheme practiced by all suppliers has harmful effects. See Bennett et 
al., supra note 55, at 1294 (summarizing the OFT-commissioned research on the impact 
of the removal of RPM in books). 
104. See OECD, supra note 55, at 178 (submission by the Netherlands). 
105. See id. at 149–50, 187–88 (submissions by Hungary and Spain, respectively). 
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2. Widening Initially Available Defenses Beyond Article 101(3) 
Grounds 
The Commission’s approach to RPM analysis is also 
problematic with respect to article 101(3) TFEU (article 81(3) 
EC) efficiency justifications by defendants. First, the approach 
creates strange asymmetries between the requirements imposed 
on competition authorities and defendants: A defendant can 
avoid condemnation of an RPM scheme only by providing 
credible and substantiated evidence of efficiencies and by 
showing that these efficiencies cannot be achieved in any other 
form.106 This limitation is the result of the analytical structure of 
article 101 TFEU. A finding that a particular restraint is 
considered a “restriction by object” prevents a defendant from 
rebutting the presumption by presenting evidence (under article 
101(1) TFEU) that the specific agreement at hand has no 
anticompetitive effects and therefore does not “restrict 
competition.” In other words, its initial defenses are limited to 
demonstrating efficiencies of the agreement under article 101(3) 
TFEU.107 Given the ambiguities surrounding RPM, which in the 
eyes of many commentators will make it virtually impossible for 
many plaintiffs to win a case that requires a full blown analysis of 
harmful effects,108 it appears unreasonable to expect a defendant 
to produce such strong, unambiguous evidence. This is true in 
 
106. See TFEU, supra note 7, art. 101(3), 2008 O.J. C 115/47, at 88–89; EC Treaty, 
supra note 7, art. 81(3), 2006 O.J. C 321 E, at 74. 
107. See id. In the interpretation of article 101 advocated in this Essay, presenting 
evidence of plausible efficiencies is the only way for the defendant to initially overcome 
the presumption of anticompetitive effects inherent in a "restriction by object" analysis. 
If the defendant succeeds in providing sufficient evidence of plausible efficiencies, the 
burden shifts back to the plaintiff (or competition authority) to prove that the restrictive 
effects outweigh efficiencies and that the agreement therefore overall is anticompetitive. 
If the analysis gets to this point it does require an assessment of the agreement's actual 
or likely effects, and the defendant arguably should be able to provide evidence that the 
agreement has no restrictive effects (even though the case analysis initially started as a 
"restriction by object" analysis). Articles 101(1) and 101(3) therefore determine the 
sequence in which evidence can be considered. This sequencing appears justified in a 
competition regime that seeks to minimize the sum of error costs and of 
enforcement/compliance costs. The Author would like to thank Miguel de la Mano of 
the Commission's Chief Economist Team for fruitful discussions of this issue. 
108. See, e.g., Blair, supra note 74, at 150 (arguing that plaintiffs would lose RPM 
cases if the burden to prove harmful effects on consumer welfare was imposed on 
them); Robert Pitofsky, Are Retailers Who Offer Discounts Really "Knaves"?: The Coming 
Challenge to the Dr. Miles Rule, ANTITRUST, Spring 2006, at 61, 64 (observing that full rule 
of reason analysis would eventually lead to per se legality of RPM). 
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particular where the defendant must persuade a skeptical 
enforcement official who has never accepted any efficiency 
justification as credible and always believes that there exists a 
better, more efficient way in which a firm should organize its 
distribution system.109 This approach suggests that the current 
analytical framework effects a de facto prohibition on RPM, 
which the new rules do not change even if they appear to widen 
the available range of defenses under article 101(3) TFEU.110 
Second, the Commission’s approach underestimates the 
role and value of experimentation on the supplier level. 
Although the Commission frequently points to the importance of 
protecting experimentation on the retail level, it conveniently 
overlooks that experimentation may play a much greater—and 
potentially more beneficial—role on the supplier level.111 
Especially in competitive markets, suppliers may have to 
constantly deal with rivals’ new product developments, shifting 
consumer tastes, and changing retail structures.112 In this 
situation, a supplier may have to constantly try to adjust 
distribution strategies in order to find more efficient means to 
promote the distribution of its own products and better reach 
consumers. Some strategies may turn out to be bad business 
decisions and be abandoned before much of a record exists. The 
greater the role of experiment, the greater the difficulty is for 
suppliers to produce the type of conclusive evidence of 
efficiencies that the Commission appears to expect. Ironically, 
the more competitive a market place is and/or the newer a 
supplier is in a given product line, the greater the need to 
experiment and the lesser the likelihood that much evidence on 
efficiencies will exist. The Commission’s approach seems to 
punish firms in those situations the most, even though in their 
case it is the least likely that RPM can have any harmful effect. 
 
109. See Blair, supra note 74, at 149–50. (discussing how allocating the burden of 
proof in RPM cases can be outcome-determinative). 
110. See Guidelines on Vertical Restraints, 2010 O.J. C 130/1, at 44. 
111. See, e.g., OECD, supra note 55, at 259. 
112. See Gary B. Charness & Kay-Yut Chen, Minimum Advertised-Price Policy Rules and 
Retailer Behavior: An Experiment By Hewlett-Packard, INTERFACES, Sept.–Oct. 2002, at 62 
(highlighting the “daunting task” faced by suppliers in designing distribution strategies 
with effective incentives for retailers); OECD, supra note 55, at 278 (U.S. delegate 
underscoring the importance of experimentation on supplier and retail levels). 
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The analytical approach outlined above, which would 
require a plaintiff to provide evidence that certain key factors 
exist in cases that typically suggest possible harm from an RPM 
scheme and an explanation why those factors are good proxies in 
the present case,113 broadens the scope of available defenses 
beyond those under article 101(3) TFEU. It would do so 
consistent with the analytical scheme in article 101. A firm could 
then not only try to prove efficiencies, but also present rebuttal 
evidence to attack the assumptions that were part of the 
plaintiff’s or competition authority’s article 101(1) TFEU story. 
This would enable the decision maker to assess the strength and 
credibility of the plaintiff’s story. For example, a defendant could 
attempt to persuade a court that the plaintiff’s stories about the 
defendant’s market power or about the likely collusive effects do 
not hold in light of the facts of the case and therefore the 
plaintiff did not meet article 101(1) requirements. 
D. Competition Authority Prioritization as Alternative 
Some have also considered whether a prioritization 
approach would be a better alternative to changing the current 
“hardcore” characterization.114 Under a prioritization approach 
the legal framework remains unchanged, but the competition 
authorities can exercise discretion in choosing RPM cases based 
on whether they create sufficient risks of harm. This approach 
might be a step in the right direction as it seeks to use procedural 
devices to reach sound substantive outcomes (i.e., decisions not 
to challenge RPM schemes that cannot be harmful). But, 
ultimately, this is not a persuasive solution, at least not in the 
long-term.  
First, the approach is conceptually difficult to defend. It 
would result in a situation where competition authorities 
implicitly acknowledge that, in certain cases, enforcement against 
an RPM scheme cannot be justified on economic grounds, but 
rely on legal rules that reflect the contrary assumption of harm 
flowing invariably from RPM. The competition authority would 
 
113. See discussion supra Part II.C.1. 
114. See, e.g., OECD, supra note 55, at 123, 177, 212 (delegates from Finland, the 
Netherlands, and the United Kingdom, respectively, explaining prioritization principles 
in RPM cases); see also Bennett et al., supra note 55, at 1295–99 (arguing for the use of 
prioritization in assessing RPM cases). 
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benefit from a presumption of unlawfulness of RPM, even 
though its own prioritization efforts recognize that the 
presumption is not well founded. Under such an approach the 
competition authority would never have to explain before a court 
why an RPM scheme it chose to prosecute was harmful in the first 
place and can almost never lose an RPM case. A cynic might 
conclude that the approach could be motivated primarily by the 
desire to make the lives of competition authorities as easy as 
possible; they would never have to do much to win an RPM case, 
and can always refer to the need to prioritize if they decide to 
drop an RPM case when enforcement action would be 
unreasonable. 
More importantly, such an approach would be at odds with 
European efforts to promote more private litigation.115 
Prioritization would be convenient and might work reasonably 
well for competition authorities, especially for those that have 
broad discretion in rejecting complaints, but cannot be applied 
by courts in private litigation. If the Commission’s efforts to 
promote more private litigation are successful, inconsistencies in 
the system are inevitable. Courts would be required to apply rules 
that, according to the prioritization efforts of competition 
authorities, are not justified. If European competition law seeks a 
regime of consistent enforcement where the various pieces are 
developed coherently, prioritization is not a sound solution in 
the long-term. 
CONCLUSION 
The Commission’s review of the vertical restraints regime 
has been a missed opportunity to confront developments in the 
RPM debate as well as the enforcement experience of national 
competition authorities and to help European competition law to 
develop analytical standards for RPM cases that are consistent 
with economic concepts. So long as a robust evaluation of RPM 
cases is prevented, there will be continuing questions about their 
legitimacy and the direction of European competition law. 
 
115. See, e.g., European Initiative on Damages Actions for Breach of Competition 
Rules, EUR. UNION NEWSLETTER (Int’l L. Office), Mar. 13, 2008, at 2–3; see also 
Guidelines on Vertical Restraints, 2010 O.J. C 130/1, at 4, 21 
  
1332 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 33:1300 
The most reasonable approach to RPM in the regulatory 
environment of the block exemption system would have been to 
put the practice in the article 5 category of restraints.116 Although 
not implemented in this review of the vertical restraints regime, 
this remains a desirable change in future reviews of the regime 
now adopted, assuming that the block exemption system will be 
maintained at all. Restraints under the article 5 regime do not 
benefit from the block exemption, but are not considered so 
inherently suspicious that they deserve a place in the lists of 
outcasts in article 4; as a result, they must be assessed on a case-
by-case basis. Viewed very narrowly, it could be argued that such a 
change would not have much of any impact; after all, restraints 
listed in article 5 would still have to be analyzed individually and 
could still be condemned without much analysis.117 But in 
practice such a change would be highly significant. There is a 
good chance that national courts, competition authorities, and 
practitioners would consider the change from “hardcore” to 
“neutral” as a signal that RPM provisions should not be swiftly 
condemned and that individual assessment of RPM agreements 
are justified, thus encouraging the type of more honest 
assessment in RPM cases advocated in this Essay. At the same 
time, the approach would not immunize all RPM strategies 
against competition enforcements. This appears to be the only 
credible way to develop a better analytical approach to RPM that 
ensures outcomes consistent with the goal of consumer welfare, 
and it is the approach that is most consistent with the framework 
for article 101 TFEU (article 81 EC) analysis based on economic 
concepts. 
This approach would also maximize the enormous 
advantage that Europe enjoys with its distributed enforcement 
system that comprises twenty-eight competition enforcers and 
twenty-seven national court systems. Designing a system that 
helps gather case experience, encourages some experiment and 
 
116. See Guidelines on Vertical Restraints, 2010 O.J. C 130/1, at 16–17. 
117. See, e.g., Eric Gippini-Fournier, Resale Price Maintenance in the EU: in statu quo 
ante bellum, in 2009 FORDHAM COMPETITION L. INST. (Barry E. Hawk ed. 2010) (arguing 
that a “reclassification” would be largely symbolic and of little practical significance as 
the difference between article 4 “hardcore” restraints and article 5 restraints becomes 
relevant only when an agreement contains other vertical restraints likely to fall under 
article 101(1) TFEU (article 81(1) EC)). As explained in the text, this argument is overly 
formalistic and underestimates the significant signal such a change would represent. Id. 
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testing of economic theories in RPM cases, and provides for 
information exchange mechanisms could in a relatively short 
time provide invaluable insight into how to improve the analysis 
of RPM. 
Such a move might initially create some uncertainty and 
lead to some strange case outcomes, perhaps in some instances 
where competition law enforcement fails to identify instances of 
bad RPM. But the challenges would not be greater than in other 
competition law areas and could be managed well by the 
European competition regime. 
